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THE UNEASY MARRIAGE OF UTILITARIAN AND
LIBERTARIAN THOUGHT
By Richard A. Epstein*
I. A MODEST AGENDA
I am grateful for the opportunity that the Editors of the Quinnipiac
Law Review have extended to me to comment on the papers prepared
for this Symposium Issue, which is devoted to an examination of my
work. Some of the papers themselves formed the basis for a spirited
discussion at the Conference held at Quinnipiac Law School in October
1999.' Others have been prepared only since the Conference took
place.2 But either way, I hope that it will prove useful for me to set out
my reactions to these papers. In organizing my response, I shall start
with the most general of the papers and then work my way down to the
papers that examine how I apply, or should apply, my general approach
to particular cases. The appropriate sequence thus begins with the
Alexander and Schwarzschild contribution, which examines my general
views on the vexed relationship between libertarianism and
utilitarianism. Thereafter I shall say a few general words about Frank
Buckley's paper on the relationship between culture and liberty. At the
next level of concreteness, I shall move on to discuss Emily Sherwin's
paper on my analysis of property, especially as it relates to the grand
takings question, and to Brian Bix's paper that does the same for my
(and Richard Craswell's) views on the role on unconscionability in
contract. Finally, in the third circle I shall deal with Stephen Latham's
James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of
Chicago.
1. See Larry Alexander & Maimon Schwarzschild, The Uncertain Relationship
Between Libertarianism and Utilitarianism, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 657 (2000); F.H.
Buckley, Culture and Liberty, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 665 (2000); Stephen G. Gilles,
Selective Funding of Education: An Epsteinian Analysis, 19 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 745
(2000); Emily Sherwin, Epstein's Property, 19 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 697 (2000).
2. See Brian Bix, Epstein, Craswell, Economics, Unconscionability, and
Morality, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 715 (2000); Stephen R. Latham, Richard Epstein on
Healthcare, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 727 (2000).
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critique of my views on health care, and with Stephen Gilles's use of
my general approach in dealing with the selective funding for education.
The first point goes to intellectual orientation and shapes
everything that follows. In dealing with legal questions, the class of
necessary deductive truths shrinks as I get older. As a younger writer, I
thought that the central libertarian principles enjoyed a privileged logic
status, such that it became almost impossible to deny their central
postulates save on pain of self-contradiction. That deductivist
orientation has some real benefits, for it encourages and allows the
detailed examination of key legal concepts, and as such inspired my
own early work on causation.3 Any ability to engage in conceptual
clarification paves the way for intelligent normative discourse by
eliminating multiple sources of error. But it would be mistaken to
confuse a necessary condition for successful legal analysis with a
sufficient one. Once the clarification is done, it still becomes necessary
to explain why it is that a principle of causation, or any of its possible
rivals ("arising out of and in the course of employment") helps advance
some sensible set of social objectives. At this point, the ultimate
challenge is to devise some consequentialist justification that uses legal
rules to help better, in the crudest form, the lot of humankind. One way
to state that point theoretically is to ask if rule A provided an outcome
that left everyone unambiguously better off than rule B, would there be
any reason to prefer rule B? It is of course possible to fight the
hypothetical by claiming that no legal rule, especially those which must
modify ongoing social relations, could sport that desirable
characteristic. But that answer is strictly beside the point if the question
is what criteria should be used in principle to examine the merit of legal
rules. If one concludes, as I do, that rule B serves no useful purpose,
then he becomes, by admission, some form of consequentialist who
finds the justification for particular choices in the consequences that
they generate.
In principle, this larger inquiry requires some degree of empirical
understanding of the incentive effects that various legal rules are likely
to have on the behavior of individuals. In addition, this approach has to
decide what rules should be adopted when rule A works for the benefit
of some and rule B for the benefit of others. Here is not the place to
deal with these matters of application in any detail. But it is necessary
3. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151
(1973).
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to say that no matter how simple or obvious the correct rule, all rules
require accepting some degree of trade-offs. In a world of scarcity, no
one gets something for nothing, so that the mere fact that all legal
regimes leave some expectations disappointed, and perhaps shattered,
after the fact is no reason to reject the rule. The question is the
frequency, severity and distribution of the losses, tempered by an
awareness of the frequency, severity and distribution of the associated
gains.
In trying to choose the appropriate set of legal rules, we therefore
have to adopt a fallibilist view of the world and hope that by starting in
sensible places we can by degrees develop a sensible overall system. In
dealing with the full range of rules, I believe that in practice-again
there are no necessary truths here-it is only possible to develop
complex structures from simple origins. The complex system of DNA
works precisely because it involves only four bases and two base pairs,
which can be strung together as building blocs for complex biological
structures. Chess works as a game because it involves only 32 pieces
(half of which are pawns) and 64 squares. Any effort to extend it to 100
squares or three dimensions, for that matter, with or without any
correlative increase in pieces would, I suspect, prove to be so unwieldy
and awkward that people would just abandon the game. This simple
example gives a general clue toward my attitude toward law and social
institutions. The basic building blocks have to be simple enough to
allow for us to incorporate them into far more complex structures.
To achieve that result in law, we have to make certain assumptions
that simplify our view of the world so that we do not aim for deep
precision at the level of human psychology or social organization. On
the former, we have to recognize that self-interest of individuals is a
dominant, but by no means exclusive, source of human motivation. We
have to understand that the law needs in general to do relatively little to
promote benevolent human motivations, except to protect them from
frustration by others with nasty motivations. But in dealing with
complex interactions, the foibles of individuals, however telling, will
not afford us an accurate guideline to the rules needed to keep people
apart (so that they do not kill each other) or which bring them together
(to engage in cooperative ventures). The old Humean account which
speaks of self-interest tempered by confined generosity sets the stage as
well as can be set, even if it does not capture every form of angst or
aspiration that dogs the human soul.
2000]
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Starting with that stripped-down account of human nature, the first
task is to prevent collision between people, and this is done
affirmatively, by recognizing the autonomy of each person over his or
her person, and negatively, by prohibiting the use of force or deception
to compromise that autonomy. Next, the law has to find some way to
assign rights in external things to individuals, and here we have to
recognize that some forms of property work better in individual hands
and others work better when they remain in the commons. The creation
of exclusive rights in lands and chattels does encourage investment in
the acquisition and preservation of resources. The creation of a
commons in water and air promotes the easy coordination of activities
between individuals. The creation of so-called intellectual property
rights in inventions, writings, and name and likeness is meant to finesse
the difficulties for things that are not created unless they are placed in
the private domain, but which are not fully utilized unless, at some
point, they become part of the public domain. Hence the complex
regimes that created limited and guarded monopolies in these resources.
Notwithstanding the critical role that these components place in
modem society, the vast bulk of legal thought was directed to things
which started out without owners, but which were best managed when
placed in the hands of individual owners. For those a rule of first
possession-a rule of capture for animals, and occupation for land-
often provided a cheap and easy way to make the transition. And once
labor and property were assigned single owners, the law of tort could
protect them from invasion, and the law of contract could facilitate
gains from trade by allowing the transfer and redefinition of rights in
both property and labor.
These first four rules, autonomy, property, contract, and tort, which
I have termed elsewhere the libertarian quartet, remain a part and parcel
of every sensible system of legal rules.4 Life would be simpler than
might otherwise appear to be the case if these rules were able to address
every problem that we faced in an ordinary society. But the libertarian
position, which stresses the delineation of rights, runs into real
difficulties when they appear to disserve all the individuals whom they
govern. Historically, the strongest attacks on libertarian beliefs all
stemmed from real world examples of how they failed, of which the
tragedy of the commons-the overconsumption of natural resources
4. See Richard A. Epstein, The Libertarian Quartet, REASON, Jan. 1999, at 61
(reviewing RANDY E. BARNETF, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY (1998)).
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under the rule of capture-was perhaps the most notable. The law
therefore developed rules that made it impossible to dam up and divert
an entire stream, and it authorized the creation of new property rights
for oil and gas to prevent the needless destruction of these natural
resources.
A common thread runs through these developments. In each case
the concern with the systemwide losses created an impulse to allow a
broad class of beneficial forced exchanges that work in flat violation of
the standard libertarian rules: individuals are told that they must yield
what they have in order to gain something of greater value in exchange.
Huge portions of the law, from the private necessity cases to the entire
area of eminent domain, have dealt with the question of how these
benevolent forced exchanges could be identified and sensibly regulated.
The recognition of these legitimate uses of coercion were not designed,
in my view, to advance social utility as some disembodied good.
Rather, they were designed to make sure, to the extent that human
institutions could do it, that state coercion was applied in ways that left
all individuals better off by their own lights than they would have been
if the only rules accepted as legitimate in the state were the libertarian
quartet.
As ever, refinement carries a positive price tag. Accordingly, we
give up on some element of simplicity so that Simple Rules for a
Complex World (1995) does not become The Simplest Rules for a
Complex World. In order to overcome some serious bargaining
problems, it is necessary to beef up, however reluctantly, the coercive
power of the state. The institutional design problem thus becomes: what
set of legal restrictions can be imposed on the state to minimize the
abuses relative to the accomplishment of its mission of overcoming the
common pool and public good problems that arise in nature?
II. REPLY TO ALEXANDER AND SCHWARZSCHILD
My introduction offers, in a nutshell, the world view that
Alexander and Schwarzschild attack in their short but incisive critique
of my world view. Their central theme is to say that I cannot have it
both ways by claiming, as I do, joint allegiances to what could be called
roughly the libertarian and utilitarian foundations of the position. They
pose question after question, the main function of which is to force me
to take sides in the philosophical debate.
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My uneasiness with their critique stems from their choice of
method. Looking through the short piece, it is clear that it starts with
grand questions that always engender the kind of philosophical doubt
that I find it, temperamentally and intellectually, uncomfortable to deal
with. Their strategy is immediately to raise the debate to its highest
permissible level of abstraction. Right off the bat, the question is
whether I am a Benthamite who believes in the greatest good for the
greatest number. At that rarified level, the question is whether I wish to
maximize pleasure, wealth or preference satisfaction, and if so whether I
think that the preferences of animals, infants, future generations or
cognitively impaired count. Next we have to unpack the idea of
preferences, which contains in itself all sorts of hidden ambiguities and
instabilities.
My reaction to their barrage of questions is that it gets us off onto
the wrong foot in legal philosophy. My approach starts with the
inextricable tie between careful legal analysis of cases and wider
questions of general political philosophy. The lawyer does best, and in
the long run the philosopher too,5 not by starting with global issues of
immense difficulty. Rather, the simpler approach is to start carefully
with particular disputes and to ask which of two given conceptions
works better in order to resolve that principle. Thus, if the question is
one of contract formation, do we believe in the objective or subjective
theory of contracts, and why? Or the question could be, do we think
that this or that contractual provision should be nullified on grounds of
public policy and, if so, then which? It was just through this
incremental method that I developed my overall views that seek to
protect the domain of private choice and limit the domain of state
power. To get a grip on things, it is not really necessary to decide
whether we think that animals have rights in order to attack the
minimum wage law and the dislocations that it creates. And even the
elaborate discussion of preference formation does not in the end have
much to do with the evaluation of the modem generation of civil rights
laws that limit the grounds on which one person can refuse to deal or
discriminate against another. Concede the racial animus (and recognize
that it runs in all directions at times), and one theme still dominates. The
power of entry into new markets, when unconstrained by the legal
barriers and impediments, will go farther in rooting out odd forms of
5. See Richard A. Epstein, Life Boats, Desert Islands, and the Poverty of Modern
Jurisprudence, 68 Miss. L.J. 861 (1999).
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social behavior than any state mandates, especially those imposed by
their own individuals who all too often are able to seize state power and
turn it to dubious ends.
Alexander and Schwarzschild share, I think, my skepticism about
the dangers of state power and about the advantage of open entry. I
should have been much more troubled by their brief critique if they had
indicated which specific rules they endorsed, and how their concrete
positions differed from my own, and why. But at this mid level work
there is silence. Perhaps this is too much to ask for in a short paper that
is simply designed to call attention to the unavoidable tensions between
a libertarian orientation on rights and a general utilitarian, or more
accurately, consequentialist world view. So let me just mention one
tell-tale sign that they can fall into error by keeping the discourse at one
level of abstraction too high. They note that "once intellectual property
is recognized, something like a 'fair use' standard is probably
inevitable. 6 Here of course intellectual property reveals in the most
visible form all the tradeoffs that must be resolved in dealing with any
system of property. But a bit of disaggregation helps understand the
problems of looking at law solely from on high. A doctrine of fair use
is needed to deal with both copyrighted and trademarked material. It
would be odd if one could not quote material in order to criticize it, or
could not use a trademarked name for purposes of comparison or
evaluation. Hence the fair use doctrine as applied to these areas offers,
as it were, a second round of correction after the law backs off the
libertarian position to create legal rights in intangibles in the first place.
It is another instance of how forced exchanges can advance overall
social welfare. But patent law, which involves invention and not
communication, has no such need, and no doctrine of fair use has
developed even though the patent law in many other respects constantly
has to police the social bargain between the creation of the legal
monopoly in exchange for innovation, disclosure and the eventual
incorporation of the patent invention into the public domain.7 Here we
can say more or less sensible things about all these forms of intellectual
property, which tries to cope with the recurrent trade-offs that each in its
own way presents, without having to answer the ultimate intellectual
challenges that Alexander and Schwarzschild raise. In large measure, I
6. Alexander & Schwarzschild, supra note 1, at 660-61.
7. For a general discussion of the goals and objectives of the patent system, see
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989).
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regard much of legal scholarship to be a matter of proportion: be large
enough to cover something of importance, but small enough to cover it
well. Alexander and Schwarzschild hold particular views that often
align closely with my own, and they do so, even though they cannot
solve the ultimate mysteries of the world-either.
III. REPLY TO BUCKLEY
My comments on Frank Buckley's erudite piece are brief. Buckley
does not offer a critique of my work, but rather directs his fire to the
wide range of communitarian and conservative thinkers who find deep
internal contradictions within the kind of simple-minded market-based
system that he, and I, generally defend. Here I agree with Buckley that
most of these doubts tend to be overstated. Schumpeter may well be
right to have asked how it was that capitalist institutions could obtain
the loyalty of the general citizenry. And when graduate school in the
social sciences and the humanities was the choice of the ablest of
college graduates, that criticism may have struck a nerve. But today as
we watch these same college graduates veer away from the professional
schools, to management consulting, to investment banking, and to
internet start-ups-that concern rightly has to be dismissed as a bit
dated, if it ever were correct.
Indeed, more powerful psychological forces play their part. No
matter what area of work people go into, they are driven personally and
socially to rationalize their choices and to reflect critically therefore on
the institutions of which they are a part. If market institutions do well
by inventors and techies, we can expect some of them at least to come to
their defense, if only after retirement. More generally, any student of
philanthropy knows that it is a dangerous oversimplification to claim
that culture and markets are always at odds. That claim is manifestly
overdrawn in light of the many individuals who do both commercial and
cultural work, and understand fully the difference between the two sets
of norms and the ways in which they reinforce each other.
On this vein, I would just make brief reference to Tyler Cowen's
recent study, In Praise of Commercial Culture (1998) whose main point
reinforces a theme I hold dear. Artistic creativity flourishes in
competitive markets where young artists are not beholden to single rich
patrons, but can establish relationships with the dealers of their choice.
High-minded, patrician monopolists are more dangerous than vulgar
dealers. We need to do far more to explore the connections between
QLR
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culture and commerce. But we should not assume that the latter is some
inflexible enemy of the former.
The state presents still other threats to artistic creativity, for it has
the capacity to stifle art, culture and liberty simultaneously. It should
take little imagination to realize what Soviet dominance did to Russian
art and culture, not to mention the local cultures of the many smaller
nations under the Soviet thumb. But the United States is not immune to
that risk either. Short of banning private contributions to art, we could
remove the charitable deduction, so that an ever-larger fraction of
support for the arts comes direct from the state. The eminent domain
power can break up coherent communities by uprooting individuals
from their traditional homes. It is all too easy to assume that defenders
of private property neglect neighborhoods and relationships that allow
human culture to flourish. But at the end of the day the true villain of
the story is often the eminent domain wrecking ball which swings too
frequently precisely because the loss of good will-the loss of affective
relationships-is systematically kept out of the compensation calculus
by Supreme Court Justices who are so anxious to defend comprehensive
state planning that they are blind to the excesses that it induces. After
all, good will is not taken, only destroyed.8 Soft values are of course
important to any culture, and it should hardly come as comfort to either
communitarians or conservatives to note that the courts remove these
from the social calculus because of the difficulty of calculation.
IV. REPLY TO SHERWIN
These brief ruminations on culture and condemnation segue nicely
into Sherwin's paper, which is also written from a sympathetic point of
view. As with Alexander and Schwarzschild, she writes from a critical
rather than a programmatic stance. Her appointed task is to expose the
weakness of my position, not to develop her own alternative world
view. Her basic point is that my willingness to defend the eminent
domain compromise-the state may take if for public uses but only if it
pays the owner just compensation-runs into serious tension with any
tough-minded theory of property. As she notes in her paper, a complete
set of property rights (including, of course, their correlative duties)
entails three different sets of rules. "One set defines an object of
property, another defines the conditions of its ownership, and the third
8. See generally Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949);
United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946).
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governs the incidents of property ownership."9 Thus a good set of rules
would have to treat land, or at least interests in land, as property rights;
it would have to develop rules to determine who owned that thing; and,
lastly, it would have to decide the rights that flowed once ownership
was established, most notably the classical trinity of possession, use and
disposition.
Sherwin is correct to note that the shift between the second and
third stages is critical to the overall project: what use is there to the
protection of property if, for example, it carries with it only the right to
exclude,'0 but does not carry with it the right to occupy, use or dispose?
The case law generally pays lip service to the larger definition of
property," but in cases of the so-called regulatory takings, it often
follows that initial crescendo with the limp conclusion that property is
not taken so long as some viable economic use for it survives.' 2 So the
real question is whether the payoff to rights has the hard-edged position
that I defend in Simple Rules or whether the ostensible rigor of the first
two stages turns to mush at the third.
Clearly, the full set of common law decisions, ancient and modern,
exhibit a kind of intellectual sprawl from which it is possible to extract
any given conclusion. And Sherwin is surely right to note that the
common law of nuisance, as articulated in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts resorts almost effortlessly to terms like "unreasonable invasion" in
drawing the line between tortious and nontortious conduct. 3 But of
course there is yet another way to look at this problem that coexists with
the Restatement approach and which I have long defended.' 4 Any large
9. Sherwin, supra note 1, at 703. For her longer discussion, see Emily Sherwin,
Two- and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1075, 1087, 1093
(1997).
10. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (finding a taking where the
United States demanded public access to a private marina as a condition for allowing
access from the marina to public waters).
11. See, e.g., Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. at 372.
12. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822, 826 (1979).
14. See Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian
Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979). The title of this paper indicates that it is a
transitional phase in that I think that the basic libertarian rules for the rectification of
wrongs under a corrective justice, strict liability principle are subject to an overlay to
take into account the weaknesses of that rule in high transaction costs environments.
What I did not see in that paper is that the initial decision to lump the rights of
possession, use and dispostion in the same person itself has strong transaction cost
justification, for it prevents holdouts between those who would have, by assumption, the
right to possess, but not the right to use or to sell. It should not be thought that the
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invasion of one person's property should be regarded as prima facie
wrong and subject to injunction unless the defendant brings himself
within a narrow set of justifications, such as consent or self-defense,
both of which are usually inapplicable in disputes between neighbors.
The idea of reasonableness is then tied to the older "live-and-let-live
rules," in which one set of low-level interference is tolerated precisely
because it improves the lot of all individuals to the overall social
situation." On this view the legal inquiry is not whether, as Sherwin
sometimes put its, "Do X, unless you can achieve more good by not
doing X," at which point the rigor of the initial premise breaks down
because of its mushy exception. 6 Rather, the question is whether each
side looks better off when it swaps out its right to enjoin certain low-
level interference for the same right as others. That bargain looks good
to me, and the rule here has proved amazingly stable over time. Its key
virtue is that it allows us to escape the dilemma that Sherwin thinks
takes hold in these cases. Either have rules of compensation that are as
tough as those which define property, or the advantages of hard-edged
rights are lost in the search for a set of flexible case-by-case rules-the
very point on which she ends her article." Yet there is a nifty way out.
By asking people to put themselves all into the same boat, and by giving
them the choice only of low-level interference or no interference, we do
not have to deal with some grand question of valuation for each petty
incursion on a case-by-case basis. That ability to reduce the level of
generality means that both the rule and its exception maintain a
workable level of precision.
I think that this point can be generalized to note that the valuation
problems imposed by any recognition of the eminent domain right do
not cast us adrift in some formless utilitarian sea. Start with the simple
case where land is simply taken outright. If it has improvements on it, if
it has private locational advantages for business, or if it faces uncertain
market demand, then valuation is always a problem. Does one use a
capital asset pricing model? What about the use of replacement cost
less depreciation? What about sales of comparable properties? The
traditional bundle of rights is an odd assemblage. It has a deep functional structure that
is, alas, misunderstood when for constitutional purposes the Court often shies away from
that definition in favor of one that over-emphasizes the right to exclude. See Kaiser
Aetna, 444 U.S. at 164.
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. g., § 831. For the classic
exposition, see Bamford v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 32-33 (Ex. 1862).
16. Sherwin, supra note 1, at 713.
17. See id. at 714.
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cases are filled with discussions of the proper method of valuation. Yet
here we are fighting usually over the last ten percent of value, and the
system that can keep the wobble to that level can usually survive even if
it does not nail down severance damages to the precise dollar. I would
be hard pressed to think that these problems of valuation would lead
anyone to advocate getting rid of the compensation requirement
altogether or advocating some clear rule that is known to be wrong-all
parcels get $10 per square foot regardless of market values.
Regulatory takings of land-I shall turn later to overall economic
regulation-differ from outright condemnation in two ways. First, the
owner is left in possession of the property, so the taking is by definition
partial. Second, the legal initiative applies to many persons, thereby
opening up the possibility that the new restrictions on one provides
offsets to others. Here we can carry over the insight about the average
reciprocity of advantage from the live-and-let-live cases to make some
progress on the question of valuation. Some restrictions are so skewed
that the market value of the land subject to the restriction gyrates
instantly. Two parcels of land, both of which were once worth $10,000
are now worth $15,000 and $2000 respectively, a distributional skew
and an overall loss in market value, which is, it must be stressed, not
likely to be set off by some mysterious increase in joint subjective
value. In this case the usual appraisal practices used for land taken can
be carried over, on a before and after basis, to land subject to
regulation-taking care that the before value is not improperly reduced
to reflect the risk of insufficient compensation under the takings law.
Since the return benefits of regulation to others are included in the
valuation, we do not have to try to value separately the restriction
imposed and the return benefits received. The one number will work
across the board.
In most cases, moreover, the calculations will be clear. The land in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 8 lost seventy-five percent of the
value when the zoning ordinance was imposed, and no one was
prepared to make that up out-of-pocket in order to keep the zoning
scheme alive. What could be easier than saying that this restriction on
use-tantamount to the taking of a restrictive covenant for the public-at-
large-generates a prima facie obligation to compensate. That
obligation of course could be tempered by showing that the regulation
was needed to curb some wrong to third parties, such as the creation of a
18. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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nuisance. But this case involved the regulation of a contiguous sixty-
eight acre plot of land whose use (as a Fisher Body Co. plant) posed no
harm to anyone.' 9 In cases therefore where the level of government
behavior is most egregious, the dangers of case-by-case evaluation of
losses do not pose much of a risk. Indeed, in most cases the state would
abandon the regulation once the obligation to compensate was made
clear so that the precise valuation would not have to be known. This
dilemma has no horns. All questions of valuation, whether regulation or
occupation, require hard work, not philosophical despair. Sherwin is
unable to show that valuation problems are so endemic that they
endanger the entire enterprise.
V. REPLY TO BIX
Professor Brian Bix questions my approach to yet another linchpin
of the classical system: freedom of contract. Bix begins on the right
foot by acknowledging that my defense of freedom of contract treats it
as a presumptive virtue, not as a necessary truth. Starting from the
midlevel I am quite happy to recognize-indeed, to insist upon-
limitations of freedom of contract that take into account the vulnerable
status of certain groups (infants, insane people, some elderly), the
defects of contract formation (duress, fraud, nondisclosure), and the
risks of adverse external consequences (contracts to kill or maim, to
bribe, to restrain trade). In many cases, I believe that certain overbroad
prophylactic rules may be preferable to case-by-case adjudication after
the fact. The writing requirement under the Statute of Frauds is such a
rule because it helps remove disputes over contractual formation. The
use of these formal requirements (of which notarization and witnesses
are other examples) may well make good sense. They help to avoid
impulse, to reduce the risk of fraud, and to memorialize a transaction
that might be litigated only years later. Most importantly, they do not
place any substantive restrictions on the price or other terms that are
incorporated into the written (or oral) agreement that complies with the
chosen formalities. Of course, we can run the risk that the forms are
imposed when they are not needed, so that they serve as a trap for the
unwary. But when the requirements are simple and well known, such as
those contained in the Statute of Frauds or the Statute of Wills, then
these dangers generally disappear. The security of transaction increases
19. For my more detailed analysis, see Richard A. Epstein, A Conceptual
Approach to Zoning: What's Wrong with Euclid 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 277 (1996).
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in ways that only complement the general legal objective to freedom of
contract, subject to the qualifications noted earlier.
The hard question for Bix and other critics of this position is to ask
what improvements they can make on the system in the name of justice,
which as Bix claims "in all its infuriating vagueness, remains the
ultimate goal." 20 In taking up this theme, Bix compares and contrasts
the approach that I have taken on unconscionability2' with the more
cautious approach to the same subject offered by my former student and
22
colleague, Richard Craswell. It is not possible for me to do justice to
Craswell's finely honed system here, but it is sufficient for these
purposes to note that his overall objective is to see if there is some
nuanced way in which a doctrine of unconscionability could be
introduced into the law of contract so that it allows for the modification
of certain key provisions short of the total invalidation of the contract.
In Craswell's view consent is not always a binary concept, so that
partial or imperfect consent might require selective intervention into
contractual freedom. From my point of view these refinements do not
do much to justify the expansion of the doctrine, even though they often
appeal to sophisticated notions of behavioral economics or game theory
to explain how certain bargains come to fail.
The nub of the difficulty is this. The various qualifications to the
principle of contractual freedom go a long way to remove from the
system those contracts that do not serve the interests, ex ante, of both
sides, and those contracts that impose system-wide prejudices against
third parties. That said, the question is, what gains can we achieve at
the margin by pursuing other strategies for intervention? The appeals to
behavioral economics and cognitive biases and game theory can surely
identify that contracts do not work as smoothly as we would like. But
the proof of the existence of these defects hardly guarantees that the
aberrant cases will be picked out in litigation (where the tendency is
always to overestimate the occurrence of rare cases) or cured in the
lucky event that they are picked out. Given the public choice risks
inherent in any curative legislation, I have strong doubts that this
program will be frequently realized, and am worried about efforts to
start down a path which promises so little by way of return and exposes
20. Bix, supra note 2, at 725.
21. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. &
EcON. 293 (1975).
22. See Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability
and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1993).
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the legal system to so much risk. I could be persuaded to change my
mind if someone could show an intervention that falls outside the
exceptions that I recognize as generating some overall Pareto
improvement: the simple requirement that all contracts state an annual
percentage rate of interest under some pre-established formula could be
one example. But in most instances the argument cannot be made.
Indeed, today the case is weaker than it has ever been, given the ease
with which anyone can enter into credit transactions, including those
executed on-line. The geographical separation of markets, which
bolsters the unconscionability doctrine, becomes weaker with each
passing technical innovation.
By parity of reasoning, I am deeply suspicious of any attempts to
approach the elusive virtue of justice head on. The program that Bix
heartily endorses has been invoked to defend labor unions, minimum
wage laws, fair housing laws, antidiscrimination laws and the like. But
the detailed investigation of each of these cases persuades me that these
forms of intervention do more mischief than good. The way to improve
markets is to open access and reduce transaction cost. Web-based
transactions do more to protect vulnerable and isolated individuals than
all the consumer protection laws that have ever been invented. We can
continue to seek justice, just so long as we do not pursue it directly. The
right path is to do what can be done to insure the procedural
prerequisites to sensible bargains-and then to stand aside.
VI. REPLY TO LATHAM
The generalized concerns raised by Bix receive a more concrete
instantiation in Stephen Latham's careful examination of my writings on
health care. As Latham rightly notes, my basic position has long been
to insist that positive rights (the right to health care, funded by the state)
is a great mistake that simply requires one class of individuals to
subsidize others-often others with greater wealth and access to the
political process. As a matter of first principle, therefore, I reject a full
range of common reforms starting with universal health care and
extending through Medicare, Medicaid, or guaranteed access to health
care.23 By implication, I think that those narrower and more focused
concerns that are designed to guard against the possibility of
23. See, for the full exposition, RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR
INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE? (1997); Richard A. Epstein, Living Dangerously:
A Defense of Mortal Peril, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 909.
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incompetence, fraud or duress cannot be lightly dismissed in medical
contexts, especially since people are forced to make their most difficult
life-and-death choices when ill-health and financial pressures leave
them vulnerable and compromised. So my basic orientation carries over
to health care, subject to the caveat that there is greater likelihood for
intervention-preferably by other private parties-on the same grounds
that I set out in my treatment of unconscionability.
Latham takes issue with much of what I say, and takes issue with
me chiefly on the questions of guaranteed access to medical care. In so
doing he attacks both my account of individual behavior and the
argument that individuals behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance would
make do with a precarious and incomplete system of voluntary health
care, that is, one that would deny that each person had a right to health
care that could be cashed out against the state. On the first point,
Latham correctly notes that desperate individuals often spend small and
large fortunes in the pursuit of useless alternative therapies or diet
supplements, and often jeopardize their long-term health for foolish or
vain reasons. 24 Yet note that these happen in today's heavily regulated
environment, which shows the futility of the state to overcome
individual acts of self-destruction, even when it tries. Once again, my
argument for markets does not rest on any illusion of human
perfectability, but only on the observation that individuals who are
forced to internalize the cost of their errors will be less likely to make
them in the first place. That said, it may well be that we can justify
some intervention for the reasons that I outlined in discussing Bix's
analysis of my views on unconscionability. As Latham suggests, drug
labeling laws offer one path to prevent fraud and confusion, and to
guard against inadvertent but deadly mistakes. But to complete the
analysis, Latham would have to ask whether private vendors of drugs
would supply these warnings voluntarily, and, if not, whether the
undersupply of private warnings is better met by government
intervention, which could easily overstate the risks of certain therapies,
as opposed, for example, to an independent website that is devoted to
drug side-effects and interactions. Here he has to take into account the
risk that the competitor of drug A may wish to saddle it with ominous
warnings in order to promote the success of his own drug B. It is all too
easy for health regulations to become hijacked for anti-competitive
ends.
24. See Latham, supra note 2, at 733.
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I am quite open to any argument that addresses these difficulties.
But what I fail to understand in Latham's argument is his leap from
difficulties in labeling to guaranteed access to minimum levels of health
care at public expense. More concretely, why does Latham then switch
ground by noting that the irregular nature of demand for medical
services introduces a whole raft of complications when people cannot
fund the costs of crisis care out of income or savings, and thus have to
make peace with insurance carriers who then insist on restricting access
to care after the fact? Here Latham supplies his own answer to the
question: markets are never efficient if that test requires that they
respond ideally to all crises. But the real issue is whether on average
private markets respond better to these challenges than government,
which often supplies first dollar coverage, even when the insurance risk
is negligible, takes the position, as with present proposals to add
prescription drugs to Medicare for first dollar coverage. To show that
markets perform better with wheat than in health care is quite beside the
point. The real issue is how, in dealing with health care, markets
outperformed, or are out performed by government regulation. On this
point, Latham shows commendable caution by noting that the hard cases
for markets are precisely those which are the hard cases for regulation.
If it is difficult to monitor or evaluate medical services for a private
provider, those difficulties do not disappear once the government moves
in to provide or fund services on a grand scale. And on this score at
least the conventional incentives to get things right are stronger with
firms that have a financial nexus than with government regulators who
do not have to bear the consequences of their own mistakes.
Latham then chides me for failing to note that the outcome of
efficient markets could well have devastating effects for those people
who have made mistakes in their choice of health care plan or medical
provider. Once again no one could deny this brute fact. But his
argument gives rise to the question: compared to what? Government
monopolies also make mistakes in rationing health care, and these too
can be devastating in individual cases, but here there is nowhere to flee
but onto some government queue. When some private health care plan
fails, we have at least the hope that something better will arise in its
place-or so we would in an unregulated market. Unfortunately, it is
very difficult today to disassemble the information on firm failures.
Latham is right to note the major distress of these plans, but does not
pay sufficient attention to the source of at least some of their afflictions:
government restrictions on the terms and conditions on which these
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services can be determined. Doubtless there are ample market failures,
but the current situation is a mix of two elements. Unless we
disentangle regulatory from market failure, we are likely to fall into the
trap that holds that the only cure for bad regulation is more regulation-
a cycle which no market system can survive. We have to be aware of
the Nirvana fallacy here, as everywhere else: we cannot compare ideal
government to imperfectly regulated private institutions.
Latham next criticizes me for the reliance that I would place on
private charity to fill the gap in a market-based system of medical
services. To his great credit, he does not simply assume that every
dollar of publicly provided medical care has to be covered by private
charity. One great tragedy of the current situation is that regulation has
run up the cost of medical service and crowded out charitable care, so
that it is quite difficult to guess what the market shortfall would be if we
had never put into place today's massive Medicare and Medicaid
programs. Yet even after making these adjustments, Latham thinks that
the old institutions could not cover the new problem because new and
expensive technology prices medical care out of the reach of most
individuals. No doubt technology is an important driver in health care,
but it is hard to see why it should be regarded as the source of modern
woes in medicine. In most private industries, new technology reduces
costs and expands opportunities, so the hard question is why has that not
happened here. After all, better computers should reduce the costs of
medical records, allow for the better tracking of individual cases, and
permit the creation of useful comprehensive databases. In other cases, it
could replace complex technologies with easier substitutes. Complex
intestinal operations can be eliminated with a single pill; balloon
angioplasty can eliminate costly surgery, and so on down the line.
So why do we greet these technical improvements with an abiding
sense of dread? One possibility is that technology takes on a mixed
coloration in a highly regulated and subsidized industry. What sense is
there to making great medical advances available free of charge to
individuals whose life can be extended just a matter of days or weeks?
The right response to some technology is to restrict its use to those cases
where it is cost justified. But so long as ICU beds are built, some
government program will be there to fill them, thereby crowding out
less expensive responses to more treatable conditions. In short, I think
that it is a mistake to act as though technology deploys itself, when the
wisdom of its use depends on the incentives for its deployment. I have
no doubt that when confronted with greater technical possibilities, an
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aging and wealthier population, would demand an increase in medical
services in both unregulated and regulated markets. But I think that the
response to these technologies would be more rational and less wasteful
in a world in which the subsidy of medical care was not taken as a moral
given.
This last observation brings us to the question of redistribution of
wealth. That issue was hinted at in a general way by Alexander and
Schwarzschild in their critique of my belief in the compatibility of
libertarianism and utilitarianism, generally conceived. Latham puts that
insight to a specific test when he asks whether my strong doubts against
forcible redistribution of wealth make sense in the healthcare context.
As a practical matter, I still think that a combination of greater
rationality in the deployment of health care resources, the increases in
general wealth, the greater ease of entry, and the provision of some
charitable services (whether by cut-rate physician services or
disinterested third party grants) could have done better than the current
system if we had not opted for the Medicare alternative in 1965.
That is of course a highly contestable proposition which many
people strenuously doubt. Latham, as one of the chorus of doubters,
makes the further argument that the use of any precarious system of
support would not, even if it were efficient, meet the requirements of
justice because it does not guarantee individuals the rights to health care
that they would, behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, demand. But I
think that his philosophical riposte rests on a mistake. The simple point
is that there are no guarantees in this world. The government that
guarantees health care has to cobble together the resources to provide it.
If the system fails to generate the wealth then we could get anything
from the deplorable health care of the old Soviet system to the erratic
health care of the British and Canadian system, neither of which has
made the necessary investments in infrastructure to keep pace with
technical advances. Behind a veil of ignorance, I think that people
would seek to maximize the likelihood that they would receive decent
health care. If it turned out that a guaranteed system was likely to suffer
system-wide failure, then they would back off those demands in a trice.
Indeed, the great tragedy today is that democratic politics has locked us
into systems with state-wide guarantees that always carry with them the
built-in risk of state-wide failure. It is perhaps not possible in a
democratic society to undo the will of the majority. But it is surely
within the bounds of permissible discourse to argue against institutional
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practices that may in the not-too-distant future prove unable to deliver
on their promises.
VII. REPLY TO GILLES
Last I turn to Professor Gilles, and here I am at something of a loss
of what to say. Gilles takes on a task quite different from that of the
other authors in this symposium. He does not seek to critique my basic
orientation but to extend it.25 His chosen topic is the selective funding
of education in kindergarten through twelfth grade, and I am happy to
report that Gilles has faithfully applied the position to the problem at
hand. He first makes just the right cautious defense of the rule that
parents should be guardians of their children. It is not that this
arrangement is perfect, but that it relies on the natural sentiments of
parents which should be allowed to control until cases of neglect and
abuse set in. Next he notes that one possible position for education is to
leave it for parents to provide for their children, so that the distribution
of sentiments throughout the nation is roughly preserved across the
generations, as no group of individuals is required to subsidize the
education of any other group. But this system is subject to the objection
(which Gilles treats by assumption as valid) that insufficient funds could
prevent some individuals from providing the education necessary to
allow their children to assume the role of useful citizens upon their
majority, so that some degree of state-support is necessary to fill the
gap. That said, the question of selective funding arises when general tax
revenues are used to fund those children who attend public schools or
nonreligious private schools, but not for those children who attend
schools of a fundamental religious orientation. In this situation, the
ideal system requires those who think that religion is an essential
component of education not be asked to subsidize those parents who do
not. The principle cannot, I might add, be justified on the ground of the
separation of church and state, for that principle would require as much
separation on the taxing side of the process as it does on the funding
side. So it appears that the liberal virtues that require the state to be
indifferent to the ends of its individual members also require that we
take either one of two positions-either we fund all educational systems
or we choose to fund none. As that is the case, then it follows that we
must be willing to avoid the trap of unconstitutional conditions-if the
25 See Gilles, supra note 1, at 745-46.
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state can fund all education or no education, then it can fund only some
education. The fallacy in this position is that the occupation of the
middle zones gives the state a degree of discretion that it does not have
when it is forced to take either nondiscrimination position-no funding
or full funding. Gilles develops my position at some length and with
great care, and enjoys my complete support in his attack on selective
funding. Sometimes it is better to end on a high note. Such is the case
here.
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